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Abstract: This paper presents an agent-based model of a land market (ALMA-C) to simulate 
the emergence of land prices and urban land patterns from bottom-up. Our model mimics 
individual decisions to buy and to sell land depending on economic, sociological and political 
factors as well as on the characteristics of the spatial environment. To this we add ecological 
and environmental considerations and focus on the question of how individual land use 
decisions can be affected to reduce the pressure on the coastal zone ecosystem functions. A 
series of model experiments helps visualize and explore how economic incentives at a land 
market can influence the spatial distribution of activities and land prices in a coastal zone. We 
demonstrate that economic incentives do affect urban form and pattern, land prices and welfare 
measures. However, they may not always be sufficient to reduce the pressure on coastal zone 
ecosystems. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Coastal zones (CZ) are important from both ecological and socio-economic points of view 
(Martínez, Intralawan et al. 2007). These are one of the most productive areas on our planet that 
provide many ecosystem services such as erosion control and sediment retention, habitat for 
species, food production, recreation and others (Costanza, d’Arge et al. 1997). Like other 
ecotones these areas are especially rich in biodiversity and have one of the highest values for 
ecosystem services per hectare of area. CZs require a delicate balance between human-
dominated systems and ecosystem functions provided by interactions of land and sea. This 
makes protection of CZs in their pristine form an important component of environmental 
management. Unfortunately, CZs are also very lucrative area for development. CZs are also one 
of the most densely populated areas housing two thirds of world’s population (Costanza, 
792
T. Filatova, A. van der Veen, A. Voinov / An Agent-Based Model for Exploring Land Market ... 
Andrade et al. 1999). Particularly in the Netherlands 70% of the Gross National Product today 
is generated in the CZ (Veraart, Brinkman et al. 2007). Pressure on CZ induced by economic 
activities causes the disruption of coastal ecosystem functions including modification of a 
shoreline, reduction of habitat’s carrying capacity and diminishing recreational value of coasts 
(Costanza, Andrade et al. 1999; Martínez, Intralawan et al. 2007). Waterfront properties are 
known to be several times more expensive than similar properties inland. People are willing to 
pay high prices for water view and water access. These areas have been also historically 
developed due to proximity to marine and river transportation. Further developments occur in 
the proximity to historic cities causing even more buildings constructed in areas vulnerable to 
flood or erosion. According to IPCC the damage from natural disasters has rapidly increased 
over the past decades due to the growth of capital in flood-prone areas (Nicholls, Wong et al. 
2007). Thus, in addition to contributing to the deterioration of coastal ecosystem functions 
economic activities located in CZ are subject to flood risks. The potential damage from 
flooding/erosion depends on the economic value of land and concentration of economic 
activities or residential areas.  
If we are to protect CZ ecosystem services we need to find ways to create disincentives for 
people allocation near the coastline. Using economic incentives to achieve environmental goals 
can be much more efficient than traditional command and control regulation, if the incentives 
can be put in place and enforced at relatively low cost (Costanza, Andrade et al. 1999). What 
can be the economic incentives and market mechanisms that would reallocate population out of 
the CZs?   
In this paper we present a simple agent-based model that integrates heterogeneous landscape, 
explicit individual location choices via land market to explore the influence of economic 
incentives on the aggregated spatial pattern of the urban area. Since the area occupied by urban 
developments actually takes over the land that provides ecosystem functions in CZ, this 
aggregated pattern indirectly shows how much pressure is put on the CZ ecosystems. 
2. THE MODEL 
Our Agent-based Land MArket for Coast model (ALMA-C) simulates the emergence of urban 
land patterns and land prices as a result of micro-scale interactions between buyers and sellers 
of land with application to a coastal city. The main agents in the model are traders, spatial 
goods (i.e. land lots) and a market (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. UML class diagram of the ALMA metamodel 
793
T. Filatova, A. van der Veen, A. Voinov / An Agent-Based Model for Exploring Land Market ... 
The core of the model is presented by a land market (Filatova, Parker et al. 2007; Filatova, 
Parker et al. under submission). ALMA-C borrows much from the analytical monocentric urban 
model (Alonso 1964) and its application to a city with green amenities (Wu and Plantinga 
2003). In line with the assumptions of the analytical model the ALMA-C model assumes that 
each spatial good is differentiated by distance (D) from the central business district (CBD) (or 
its inverse measure – proximity P=Dmax+1-D) and level of environmental amenities (A) 
(estimated as a normalized distance to the coast). Other attributes of land can be easily added if 
needed. Buyers (i.e., households) search for a location that maximizes their utility 
βα PAU ⋅=  (ά and β are individual preferences for green amenities and proximity 
correspondingly) and is affordable to their disposable budget for housing net of transport costs 
(Y). The rationality of agents is bounded by the fact that they do not search for the maximum 
throughout the whole landscape but rather search for the local maximum among N randomly 
chosen cells. We impose this assumption since the search for a house in reality is very costly 
(time-wise and money-wise), meaning that a global optimum is not likely to be located in real-
world housing markets. After defining the spatial good that gives maximum utility a buyer 
forms the bid price. A bid price is a function of utility (U), individual income (Y) and prices of 
all other goods (influence of which is expressed by a constant b): 
nn
n
bid Ub
UYP +
⋅= . The 
justification and properties of this demand function are discussed in details in (Filatova, Parker 
et al. under submission). Sellers form their bid prices also depending on their utility, bit their 
ask price do not go below the price of an open space area (Pnat).  
Having found the optimal 
location, buyers submit their 
offer-bids to the sellers. Sellers 
choose the highest bid-offer and 
if it is above their ask price, 
then the transactions take place. 
If not then both buyer and seller 
participate in the land market in 
the next times step. The final 
transaction price is an arithmetic 
average of the ask price and the 
highest bid price. Figure 2 
shows the logic of the trading 
mechanism, i.e. one time step in 
the model (more about event 
sequencing in (Filatova, Parker 
et al. under submission)). 
Let us suppose that in attempt to 
protect the coastal ecosystem 
services we are introducing a 
tax to make coastal properties 
more expensive and less affordable.  Suppose we calculate the amount of tax to be paid as 
amennat PPtrT ⋅⋅= , where tr is a tax rate in % and Pamen is proximity to the coast. 
 
3. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS 
 
Running the model we can produce spatially explicit land price gradients and land patterns as 
simulation results. We are mainly interested in how the introduction of a land tax, aimed to 
protect CZ ecosystems, affects economic indicators and the spatial morphology of the city. In 
addition to graphical representations, we also present a set of metrics to analyze micro and 
Figure 2. Conceptual algorithm of trade 
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macro economic and spatial outcomes (listed in Table 1 below). Our major metric of success 
with respect to the ecosystem services preservation is the number of undeveloped cells within 
the prime coastal zone, which is defined as the stripe of land covered by 7 cells wide along the 
coast (all the zone that lies to the left of the CBD). We will call this zone CZ buffer. 
All model experiments presented in this paper were performed on a 31x51 grid of cells with 
part of the landscape (5x cells) representing sea and a coastline. The CBD was set at the cell 
with coordinates (-4;0). There were 2652 buyers and sellers participating at the land market. 
The price of the natural area (Pnat) was set equal to 200. We run the model with agents having 
homogenous preferences for green amenities, i.e. for the view on the coastline, ά = 0.7. 
Although the code of the ALMA-C model allows simulation of a land market with 
heterogeneous agents, we did not use this possibility here to keep clarity. Transport costs per 
unit of distance were equal to 20 units, the constant b in (1) was equal to 70. 
To understand the influence of such an economic incentive as tax on the aggregated outcomes 
we ran a series of 13 experiments. We changed only two parameters in the experiments: tax rate 
and individual income, which both affect households’ willingness to pay for the house in the 
coastal city. Each experiment is associated with the value of tax and income, specifically 
experiment “3-900” means that we ran the model with a land tax equal to 3% and individual 
income equal to 900 units. We show the outcomes of 7 representative experiments in Table 1 
and discuss the results of the others below. 
Table 1. Economic and spatial metric outcomes of the ALMA-C experiments 
Parameter 0-800 5-800 5- ND 
800/20 
0-900 5-900 0-1000 5-1000 
Individual utility: 
Mean 73.17 71.86 72.68 70.26 70.59 67.79 68.15 
St. dev. 11.13 10.82 11.41 12.14 12.18 12.98 12.87 
Aggregate utility 36587.71 28672.4 34305.6 43494 40450.55 49082.77 48254.45 
Urban transaction 
price:           Mean 312.67 312.07 318.64 336.61 337.12 361.77 358.07 
St. dev. 75.84 73.92 79.49 93.15 90.61 110.15 107.86 
Total property 
value 156335.9 124514.1 147965.8 208363.2 193169.9 261924.4 253515.4 
City size (urban 
population) 500 399 472 619 573 724 708 
Undeveloped land 
in CZ buffer 86 175 117 42 74 6 12 
Distance at which 
city border stops 20.88 18.11 19.23 23.77 22.36 25.71 25.7 
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We begin with the experiment that replicates the monocentric urban model with amenities such 
as coastline. The main difference between the simulation experiment and the analytical model is 
that the centralized equilibrium land price determination mechanism is replaced by a series of 
bilateral trades distributed in space and time. Individual households endowed with income equal 
to 800 try to buy a house that maximises their utility in the coastal city. There is no tax for land 
introduced in this city. The urban land price gradient is presented in Figure 3 and quantitative 
measures can be found in Table 1, column “0-800”. The intensity of grey colour symbolizes the 
value of land: the darker the colour, the higher the land 
price. The urban land prices are the highest in the CBD. 
As in the benchmark case of a theoretical monocentric 
urban model, the land price gradient is decreasing with 
distance from the CBD. But because of the presence of 
the coast, which serves as an attractor for the 
households and increases value of the land, urban land 
laying to the left of the CBD has higher prices than the 
area to the right. The city expansion stops at the location 
when bid price of a buyer falls below the price of open 
space. The white area in Figure 3 shows the beginning 
of open space and symbolizes the city border.  
With the increase of individual income the city 
significantly expands and CZ buffer representing the 
amount of open space along the coastline decreases 
(compare experiments “0-800”, “0-900” and “0-1000” 
in Table 1). So does an average individual utility from 
location showing that people enjoy less densely 
populated city, which provides more open space along 
the coast and less commuting in terms of time and 
money. In spite of decrease in average utility land prices 
still grow because the purchasing capacity, i.e. income, 
has increased. 
We proceed with demonstration of changes in the 
location behaviour of households changes if an 
environmental tax on land is introduced. The idea is that 
now agents have to pay extra money for location closer 
to the coast, assuming all other factors are the same. If 
this happens then demand for these locations goes 
down, since it becomes harder to find buyers that could 
afford to buy there. The market mechanisms start to 
work. Since our model is not only demand-driven, 
meaning that land prices are determined via bilateral 
trades with sellers, the bid price that buyers offer is 
below the ask price (which also depends on the spatial 
characteristics of the land lot, but it could not be lower 
than the land price of the natural area). In this case the 
transaction simply does not occur and land lot is not 
occupied by an urban land use.  
Let us set the tax equal to 5% of the land price of the 
natural area. The land price gradient is presented in 
Figure 4. First of all, the spatial form of the city has 
changed. The area closer to the coast became less 
attractive for households to pay more to cover the 
threshold of the Pnat. The households in this experiment 
basically “voted with their feet” in favour of living in 
 
Figure 3. Land price gradients 
(households income = 800, no tax for 
land introduced). Red counter shows 
the CBD. 
 
Figure 4. Land price gradients 
(households income = 800, and land 
tax = 5%). Red counter shows the 
CBD. 
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another town because living on the coast now bears additional costs. As a result a lot of land in 
the “primary” CZ was left unsold and remained in natural conditions. A positive sign is that the 
CZ buffer has significantly expanded: it became 103% larger than in the city without the land 
tax aimed to preserve CZ (compare columns “0-800” and “5-800” in Table 1).  
The results of experiment “5-800” indicates that in the absence of real markets for the 
environmental services provided by the CZ economic incentives, such as taxes imposed by the 
government, may help to influence the land market to achieve more environmentally friendly 
land use patterns. However, the outcome can change quite dramatically if we open up the 
market and raise the limit on individual budgets. Effectively this means that we are inviting 
buyers that are more affluent to come from elsewhere and enter the market.  
We repeat the second experiment but assuming that richer households enter this urban land 
market (we set tax equal to 5% and incomes equal to 1000 units). The results are presented in 
Table 1 (see “5-1000”) and in Figure 5. Thus, in the 
presence of more affluent households the city not only 
expands over the borders of the city in the experiment 
“5-800” (Figure 4) but overflows the boundaries of the 
city without land tax (experiment “0-800”, Figure 3). 
High-income agents can afford to pay additional costs 
in terms of the land tax and, thus, settle along the 
coastline. This fact can often be observed in reality: the 
wealthiest individuals buy houses with a view on the 
coast. As a result the CZ buffer has shrunk to 93% of 
what it was when agents’ income was 800 (see “5-
800”). 
On the other hand, in reality not all people have equally 
high incomes. There is a certain distribution of incomes 
in the city. Figure 6 shows the land price gradients in 
the case when we run the model for the population of 
agents with heterogeneous incomes and land tax rate of 
5%. Individual incomes follows normal distribution 
with mean 800 and standard deviation of 20 (see 
experiment 5-ND 800/20 in Table 1). There are some 
households with income higher than average of 800 (as 
in experiment “5-800” and “0-800”), which can afford 
to buy houses in the CZ buffer and pay a land tax. However, market incentives still work and 
part of CZ buffer became vacant (117 instead of 86 in the case without land tax). 
 
Figure 5. Land price gradients 
(households income = 1000, and land 
tax = 5%). Red counter shows the 
CBD. 
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In fact, the last three experiments (“5-800”, “5-1000” 
and “5-ND 800/20”) showed that economic incentives 
work only if agents have fixed income. If taxes are 
introduced but the higher-income households enter the 
land market then the effect of the tax introduction is 
eliminated. The introduction of the tax and increase in 
household incomes drive spatial and land price 
dynamics in opposite directions. In this case we were 
interested to investigate the relationship between these 
two factors. We performed a series of additional 
experiments with tax rates changing from 0% to 7% and 
income changing from 800 to 1000. The results in terms 
of the CZ buffer area remained undeveloped are 
presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Number of undeveloped cells in the CZ buffer 
under different tax rates and income values 
 
 
 
 
 
Visually the relationship is presented in Figure 7. One can see that in the zone of high income 
the increase in tax gives very small effect on the CZ buffer  
4. DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
The paper aims at 
exploring the effects of 
economic incentives on 
CZ ecosystem services. 
At this stage we are 
interested in general 
qualitative trends of the 
ecological – economic 
system. We used 
artificial data for both 
the agents’ behaviour 
and the spatial 
environment. However, 
the structural validation 
of the model was 
performed (Filatova et 
al. 2007). The main 
difficulty of applying ABMs to the real world cases and model validation is in acquiring data 
about people’s preferences and perceptions. As a part of a more general survey on risk of flood 
perception carried out in March 2008, we created a questionnaire about individual preferences 
for locations, including preferences for coastal environmental amenities and individual risk 
perceptions. As the next stage of model development we plan to integrate survey data (when 
statistical analysis is available) into the agents’ behaviour in our ABM. 
The model has shown that economic incentives may help in managing the urban development 
in CZ but may not necessarily produce the desired outcome. For example, the environmental 
 
Figure 6. Land price gradients 
(households incomes follow normal 
ditribution and land tax = 5%). Red 
counter shows the CBD. 
 Individual income 
Tax rate 800 900 1000 
0% 86 42 6 
3% 92 46 10 
5% 175 74 12 
7% 314 247 158 
 
Figure 7. The percentage of CZ buffer not occupied by urban land 
use  
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tax instead of protecting the CZ by driving population away from the coast results in attracting 
more affluent residents – something clearly observed in reality. The CZ becomes populated by 
MacMansions, which still may have a positive effect on the environment assuring less 
residential density.  The problem then is that environmental quality can potentially lead to 
social injustice and unrest. The environmental tax drives people away from their native habitats, 
which then get developed and shaped for the more affluent residents.  The ABM helps quantify 
some of these impacts and analyze trends and spatial patterns as emerging outcomes of 
individuals interacting at the land market.  
Different residential patterns may occur if we bring risk perception into consideration.  While 
CZs and waterfront are attractive residential factors, they become also associated with higher 
risks of natural disaster (hurricanes, floods, etc.). These are likely to be more frequent with 
global warming and climate change. As a result, chances are that in addition to environmental 
taxes, insurance policies are likely to kick in, when insurance companies will deny insurance 
for properties located too close to the coast. In this case risk perception may become another 
major component in addition to affluence that will govern the patterns of allocation for 
residents.  Incorporating these processes into our model is the next step in our research.  
With a lack of markets for ecosystem services there should be other indirect economic 
mechanisms for CZ management, which would help account for these services in the decision 
making process. Developing tools for visualization and scenario analysis, such as the ALMA-C 
model, is an important prerequisite of environmentally sound land use planning.  
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